Hardening the Target: Modern Workplace Design to Mitigate Acts of Violence

Violence and Violence Prevention in the Workplace

Part of being a 'security person' is having the hard conversations that reasonable people really don't want to have. After all, we're the people who are supposed to have a plan for the event nobody wants to happen, and the day nobody wants to come.

With that said, it's time we (and that's society as a whole) took a good long look at how office and workplace designs can help us deter and mitigate violent attack.

There are conflicting studies and a wide variety of opinions on whether acts of violence are really on the rise, are more heavily reported than in the past, or some combination of the two. We're going to skip past that, and operate on a simpler premise:

• Acts of violence occur, and workplaces are one of the primary places they occur

• Acts of violence are difficult to predict, and any business that employs, serves or otherwise deals with people is at some risk

• Whatever the likelihood of an act of violence at a specific location, the severity of the effects should one occur make it worth a reasonable effort and expense to deter and/or mitigate it

You may notice we're not using the now-common phrase, 'Active Shooter', and that's for a reason; violence comes in a wide variety of forms, and violent people use an immense variety of means to carry out that violence. Our goal is to create a workplace that is resistant to as many types of these attacks as possible.

Supporting that is hard data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR); murders are committed with:

• Firearms

• Knives (and other edged weapons)

• Blunt Objects (bats, clubs, hammers)

• 'Personal Weapons'-hands and feet

And a host of other weapons. In short, violence is violence; the mechanism is important, but not defining. Ideally, we're looking to deter violent people from harming our staff, customers, vendors and visitors by any means.

The Active Violence Triangle

One tool you can use to visualize your goal in deterring attackers, or mitigating the effects of their attack, is the 'Active Violence Triangle.' This is a good representation of your goals when you are considering changes to your workspace that might make it more resistant to violent attack.

The triangle's sides represent the conditions which allow-or deny-the attacker to reach potential victims, and shortening any side of the triangle reduces the area inside the triangle, which represents the potential victims.

The sides consist of:

• Time until the attacker is confronted (typically by the police)

• Target density (how many potential victims are in the immediate area controlled by the attacker

• Ability (of the attacker) to move, thus evading confrontation and possibly gaining access to more potential victims

With every change or office design you consider, ask yourself if it effectively shortens any of the three sides of the Violence Triangle; if it does, it's probably an effective deterrent or mitigation to acts of violence.

Workplace Design

Most organizations who are in the process of designing a new workspace consider a variety of priorities; aesthetics, convenience, cost, fire safety and efficiency. And while these are undoubtedly important, there is seldom any thought given to creating an environment that is a secure shelter in a violent event. With prior planning and a little forethought, however, we can incorporate security and defensibility into our design without negative impacts on other concerns. Here are some considerations:

Access Control: most modern businesses of even moderate size will use an access control system that allows or denies access based on a credential (like a card or fob), a personal identifier (like a PIN) or a biometric trait (like a fingerprint reader.) What's important to remember about these systems is they are only effective if they are aggressively maintained, with separated employees denied access as close to instantly upon separation as possible; the goal here is to prevent a disgruntled employee from going home (or even to his car) and coming back with a weapon or other threat and getting back into the building before their access is cancelled. Even a brief survey of recent violent incidents at employer locations will show a good number of them are committed by employees as, or just after, they are separated from the company.

Another key component of using an access system to increase defensibility is intelligent zoning and control of access within the workspace. While it's a bit more work to setup and manage, 'zoning' access areas to ensure people have access to the spaces they actually need to visit, and don't have access to unrelated spaces, can be a key part of adding defensibility to your office. It minimizes the chances an aggressor, even one with a current access credential, will be able to move freely throughout the entire space, and will minimize the available spaces to an attacker even if they have a stolen or compromised credential

Physical Layout: the majority of businesses are designed for convenience and aesthetics. The designer wants the space to be easy to access for customers, easy to work in for staff and attractive to both. And while those are both important considerations, we can incorporate some subtle, but effective, deterrence and defensibility into those designs without compromising either aesthetics or convenience.

The first consideration is how the exterior of the space will be constructed. Modern office spaces in high-rise or shared buildings are typically built with glass frontage, sometimes including glass doors. And while attractive, these offer very little protection from an attacker.

Glass frontage can be replaced by solid walls, of course, but that often sacrifices the desired aesthetics. A better solution is to use the glass frontage, and even a glass door, if desired, and have it open on a small reception or waiting area. The rear (from the entrance perspective) of this vestibule can then be made with solid walls, a solid-core (ideally steel) door and a separate set of access controls, essentially isolating the vestibule from the main body of staff and interior work areas. If the budget and use case permits, the ideal set-up would include a reception portal (either a video phone or similar technology) rather than a live receptionist, and camera coverage for the vestibule area available to the person responsible for greeting and escorting guests. This allows for the person responsible for allowing people to enter to view and evaluate them prior to opening the interior perimeter of the work area to them.

Once past the vestibule, consider the access guests and visitors are given carefully. While open workspace floor plans are popular, consider a secondary controlled access space with meeting rooms, presentation rooms and other areas designed to meet and entertain customers, visitor and guests. Using this secondary perimeter can give another layer of defense should an attacker get through the vestibule, and can also minimize the disruption to staff from guest traffic through their workspace.

Interior Spaces: while we all know that former and recently separated employees present a risk group for acts of violence, some studies show that up to 40% of these incidents involve a current employee-often one getting disciplined, or even called in for separation. With that being the case, we need to recognize that the attacker may well have an active credential to enter the space.

So how do we protect people from someone that might have the same access privileges they have? Ironically, by creating spaces that are not controlled (or at least not solely controlled) by the access system, but instead have manually operated and mechanical locks that allow an occupant to secure it against anyone on the outside, regardless of their access privileges.

The simplest way to accomplish this is with a high-quality 'barrel bolt' lock mounted on a solid-cored door; this allows an occupant to quickly throw the bolt(s) and barricade the room from attack. Statistics on the timeline and mindset of violent attackers show that often, unless the person inside the room is particularly selected for attack, the attacker will not spend significant effort and time opening a locked door just to inspect a random room. Spaces without windows or door sidelights are ideal for these locks, so look at copier rooms, store rooms and other enclosed spaces.

It should be noted that an integral component of a plan like this is instructing, and then exercising, your staff in how the layers of defense operate. This should include:

• Discussing the hazards of propping doors (a major failure point in even high-security spaces)

• Talking about the risks of letting in unscheduled or unknown visitors into the workspace

• Signs of an act of violence

• Areas that are prepared and configured (like our spaces with barrel bolts) to be particularly defensible

There's no one workplace design that will prevent all acts of violence, or work for all businesses. But careful consideration during the layout and design phase of new workspaces, particularly if an experienced security person is involved, can significantly improve the deterrent and defensibility of the space, often with little or no added costs and minimal, if any, impact on the convenience or aesthetics of the design.

Violence has been around for the entirety of human history. Sadly, we don't seem any closer to eliminating it than we were 100 years ago. Reasonable planning to mitigate it is good business.